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Abstract
We study the online budgeted allocation (also called ADWORDS) problem, where a set of impressions arriving
online are allocated to a set of budget-constrained advertisers to maximize revenue. Motivated by connections to
Internet advertising, several variants of this problem have been studied since the seminal work of Mehta, Saberi,
Vazirani, and Vazirani (FOCS 2005). However, this entire body of work focuses on a single budget for every
advertising campaign, whereas in order to fully represent the actual agenda of an advertiser, an advertising budget
should be expressible over multiple tiers of user-attribute granularity. A simple example is an advertising campaign
that is constrained by an overall budget but is also accompanied by a set of sub-budgets for each target demographic.
In such a contract scheme, an advertiser can specify their true user-targeting goals, allowing the publisher to fulfill
them through relevant allocations.
In this paper, we give a complete characterization of the ADWORDS problem for general advertising budgets.
In the most general setting, we show that, unlike in the single-budget ADWORDS problem, obtaining a constant
competitive ratio is impossible and give asymptotically tight upper and lower bounds. However for our main result,
we observe that in many real-world scenarios (as in the above example), multi-tier budgets have a laminar structure,
since most relevant consumer or product classifications are hierarchical. For laminar budgets, we obtain a competitive
ratio of e/(e− 1) in the small bids case, which matches the best known ADWORDS result for single budgets. Our
algorithm has a primal-dual structure and generalizes the primal-dual analysis for single-budget ADWORDS first
given by Buchbinder, Jain, and Naor (ESA 2007). However many new ideas are required to overcome the barriers
introduced by laminar budgets—our algorithm uses a novel formulation that overcomes non-monotonicity in the
syntactically defined dual variables, as well as a dynamically maintained labeling scheme that properly tracks the
“most-limiting” budgets in the hierarchy.
Index Terms
Internet advertising, adwords, user targeting, primal-dual algorithms
I. INTRODUCTION
The online budgeted allocation problem, also called the ADWORDS problem, has had a significant impact on
the theory and practice of online (Internet) advertising. In this problem, an advertisement publisher is tasked with
matching user-generated advertisement slots on a web page (typically called impressions) to advertisers (typically
called bidders). More formally, the publisher is given a set of offline bidders u ∈ U at the outset of the problem,
each of which is specified by a budget Bu indicating the maximum revenue the publisher can receive from bidder
u. A set of impressions v ∈ V then arrive in an online sequence and must each be irrevocably assigned to a unique
bidder. Upon assigning impression v to bidder u, the publisher receives revenue ruv (typically called a bid value)
from bidder u. The objective is to maximize the total revenue generated over all impressions.
The ADWORDS problem was introduced in the seminal work of Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani [22]. While
this problem generalizes the classic online matching problem introduced by Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani [19], the
research focus has been on the so called small bids case, i.e., on algorithmic performance as the ratio maxv∈V buvBu
tends to 0 for all advertisers. This assumption models most real-world scenarios, where the revenue generated
from a single impression is infinitesimal compared to the total budget of an advertiser. The small bids assumption
distinguishes ADWORDS from online matching and makes them incomparable from a technical perspective; given
its natural applicability and popularity in Internet advertising, we will also focus primarily on the small bids case.
Since the introduction of these problems, several variants of ADWORDS and online matching have been studied,
motivated primarily by the evolving challenges advertisement publishers face in practice. For example, Agrawal and
Devanur [4] recently considered arbitrary linear and non-linear convex budget constraints for the stochastic input
model, and Devanur and Jain [12] studied concave returns on revenue, both motivated by problem features such as
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Fig. 1. Illustration of how the “Californian female” example translates into a bidder’s budget in an instance of ADGENERAL
(and in this case also ADLAMINAR). For simplicity, we only have a Los Angeles residency subdivision for the 30-39 age
range, giving us four dimensions in total. Observe that Ks = {2, 3} for the 30-39 age-range budget, and and Ks = {1, 2, 3, 4}
for the overall budget; furthermore, we have that B{2,3}u = 1000 and B
{1,2,3,4}
u = 2500. The algorithm has currently earned
$500, $100, and $400 on dimensions 1, 3, and 4, respectively (and $0 on dimensions 2); therefore, we have used $1025 out
of the overall budget’s capacity of $2500. If an impression v is newly assigned to this bidder u such that r(1)uv = $10 and
r
(k)
uv = 0 for k = 2, 3, 4, then we will have then earned $510 on dimension 1 and $1035 overall.
under-delivery penalties and pay-per-click advertisements. Another motivation for these variants that is receiving
increasing attention is that of impression diversification or representativeness. More specifically, a campaign contract
is usually of the form: “deliver ten million advertisements to Californian females in the month of July.” Although
such an agreement clearly indicates a target group to which the publisher should restrict its assignments, often the
advertiser still wants the impressions to be equally spread among the sub-populations of the targeted group (e.g.,
in the above contract, the advertiser will likely be unhappy if their ads are only shown to white females in their
twenties living in Los Angeles). Although it can be at odds with short-term revenue gains, ensuring diversity is
crucial with respect to long-term revenue for the publisher, as advertisers that see a high return on investment (in
this case via reaching desired audiences) are more likely to continually purchase future contracts.
There are several recent works that address impression diversification (e.g., see [15], [7], and [17]). In many of
these results, the objective function of the problem incorporates a diversity penalty, usually in the form of a distance
function that incurs a cost if the algorithm’s assignment differs too much from the advertiser’s ideal allocation.
However another natural approach, which to the best of our knowledge has yet to be considered, is a scheme where
contracts are specified over multiple tiers of user-attribute granularity. Recalling our previous contract example, in
a multi-tier scheme the advertiser could further specify constraints in terms of age groups, e.g., “no more than four
million of the total ten million advertisements should be shown to age groups 20-29, 30-39, and 40+, respectively.”
Further constraints could also be placed on each age group in terms of residency, e.g., “of the maximum four
million advertisements assigned in each age group, no more than two million should be shown to residents in Los
Angeles.” This scheme has several appealing features, the foremost being that it allows advertisers to explicitly
indicate their true user-targeting goals with a high degree of expressibility (whereas penalty functions often assume
that the ideal allocation must follow the same distribution as the overall targeted population, i.e., is forced to be a
representative sample).
With this motivation, we introduce a generalization of the ADWORDS problem that we call ADWORDS with
general budgets (denoted ADGENERAL). As earlier, there is an offline set of advertisers U , and a set of impressions
V that arrive online. We also have a set of dimensions Ku for each bidder u that represent the smallest level of
user-attribute granularity over which the bidder defines her budgets. In our previous example, one dimension would
correspond to “Californian females living in Los Angeles in the age range 20-29”; another dimension would be
“Californian females living outside of Los Angeles in age range 40+”. For simplicity of notation, we will consider
a universal set of dimensions K = ∪uKu and assume that each bidder has this same set of dimensions; dimensions
in K \Ku will simply earn no revenue and have no budget constraints for bidder u. If an impression v is assigned to
an advertiser u, then the algorithm earns r(k)uv (called the bid value in dimension k) on each dimension k ∈ K. Note
that we allow multiple non-zero r(k)uv revenue entries for a single impression-bidder pair (u, v). This is to reflect the
fact that certain categories are more definite than others. For instance, the campaign that an advertisement belongs
to is known but attributes of an online user may be less certain. If an anonymous online user has a 60% chance of
being below 30 and 40% of being above 30 (e.g., based on browsing behavior), then the revenue earned for this
user should be split in the same proportion between these two user category dimensions. In this case, the bid vector
has a non-zero entry in multiple dimensions. (The reader is referred to Chatwin [11] for an overview on uncertainty
in determining online user attributes. Adhikari and Dutta discuss how attribute uncertainty is weighted in real-time
bidding strategies [1], while Ghosh et al. [15] highlights the different levels of information about the users available
to different entities in Internet advertising. Techniques for determining user attributes based on historical and prior
behavior have also been extensively studied in the marketing research community (see Barajas Jamora [6] and
references contained therein), where the mapping of user behavior to attributes is inherently probabilistic.)
The revenue generated from an advertiser u is subject to an arbitrary set of budget constraints Su, where each
constraint s ∈ Su caps the total revenue generated from a subset of dimensions Ks to a budget B(s)u (see Figure
1 to see how subsets of dimensions are used to define the budgets in our example). As usual, the objective in the
ADGENERAL problem is to maximize the total revenue generated by the algorithm. We will measure our algorithms
using competitive analysis, which is the maximum ratio over all instances of the objectives of an optimal solution
and the algorithmic solution (see, e.g., [9]).
A natural question is whether this generalization changes the structure of the ADWORDS problem. To understand
this, let us consider an instance with a single advertiser. In this case, an algorithm that assigns all impressions to
the lone advertiser is clearly optimal for the ADWORDS problem. However, let us now consider the ADGENERAL
problem with 2 dimensions, and budget constraints of $1 each on dimensions {1, 2} and {2, 3}. Now, suppose the
first impression has a revenue of $1 on dimension 2 alone. Should the algorithm assign the impression to the lone
advertiser? If it does, then the instance will generate two impressions yielding a revenue of $1 on dimensions 1 and
3 each, while if it does not, then the instance will generate no other impression. Clearly, this example shows that no
algorithm can do better than a competitive ratio of 2, even with a single advertiser. One may object that the small
bids assumption is being violated, but replacing an impression of bid value $1 with 1/ impressions of bid value
→ 0 still produces a constant lower bound of 3/2. In fact, this lower bound is a manifestation of a more general
observation: it may be a better option for the algorithm to not allocate an impression, or to not earn revenue
from some of the dimensions, even when possible to do so. This is in sharp contrast to the classical ADWORDS
problem, where an impression should always be allocated if possible. Thus, the ADGENERAL problem introduces
an aspect of “admission control” to the ADWORDS framework. Our results for ADGENERAL are characterized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The competitive ratio of the ADGENERAL problem is Θ(lg p) under the small bids assumption, where
p = maxu∈U,k∈K |{s : k ∈ Ks}| denotes the the maximum number of budget constraints for an advertiser to which
any dimension belongs.
Although there is a super-constant lower bound for ADGENERAL, we observe that many multi-tier budgets based
on real-world instances will have additional structure. As we saw earlier in our motivating example, each budget
constraint was a subdivision of a more general constraint, i.e., the total budget for Californian females was divided
into age groups to obtain the second level of budgets, and then each of these age groups was divided based on
residency to obtain the next level. In essence, many consumer and product classifications are naturally hierarchical.
If the budgets of an ADGENERAL instance are defined over such a taxonomy, then we have the additional structure
that the budget sets {Ks : s ∈ Su} for each bidder u form a laminar family, i.e., for every pair of intersecting sets
in {Ks : s ∈ Su}, one is contained in the other.
Thus, we also consider the ADWORDS with laminar budgets problem (ADLAMINAR). It turns out that laminar
budgets make admission control redundant — the algorithm can now earn revenue whenever possible. However,
there are other conceptual difficulties. Consider an instance with 2 dimensions, where an advertiser has a budget of
$1 for dimension 1 and an overall budget of $2 for dimensions {1, 2}. At any point in the algorithm, what is the
total budget of dimension 2, i.e., cap on total revenue earned from dimension 2? This value clearly depends on the
revenue earned on dimension 1, and therefore changes during the course of the algorithm. This is in sharp contrast
to the classical ADWORDS setting where the total budget of a bidder remains unchanged during the course of the
algorithm (note the distinction between total budget and remaining budget). The first technical hurdle, therefore, is
to define a dynamic notion of total budget on individual dimensions. In addition, we also need to define a notion
of current budget utilization for individual dimensions to determine which dimensions we should prefer in making
the allocation. Again, this notion is canonical in the classical ADWORDS problem – it is simply the fraction of the
budget of a bidder that has already been earned as revenue. In our more general setting, a single dimension might
be in multiple budget constraints, and therefore, we must first identify the most constraining budget. Once we do so,
we need a mechanism for importing the budget utilization of this constraining budget to the dimension itself. For
instance, in the example above, if the revenue earned on dimension 1 is $1 and that on dimension 2 is $0 at some
point in the algorithm, then should be budget utilization for dimension 2 be 0.5 (from its most constraining budget
constraint) or 0 (from the fact that the algorithm has not earned any revenue at all from dimension 2 yet)? It turns
out that these concepts (revenue cap, most constraining budget, and budget utilization of a dimension) are closely
tied to each other and have to be defined through a common inductive process. Our main technical contribution
for the ADLAMINAR problem is to carefully define these entities in a way that ensures semantic consistency and
eventually gives our main result for this problem: an algorithm with a competitive ratio of e/(e− 1), matching that
for the classic ADWORDS problem [22].
Theorem 2. The competitive ratio of ADLAMINAR is e/(e− 1) under the small bids assumption.
Finally, we study the ADGENERAL problem without the small bids assumption. In the absence of this assumption,
there are two possible variants – either (a) the algorithm can choose the amount of revenue it earns on any given
dimension (which can be less than the corresponding bid value) from an impression, or (b) the algorithm is
constrained to earn the entire bid value as revenue on any dimension, which means that an assignment of an
impression to an advertiser is only allowed if adding the bid value to the previously earned revenue on each
dimension does not violate any constraint. The former is more natural in the context of Internet advertising – we
call it the ADGEN-P problem1 and match the bounds in the small bids case.
Theorem 3. The competitive ratio of the ADGEN-P problem is Θ(lg p), where p = maxu∈U,k∈K |{s : k ∈ Ks}|
denotes the the maximum number of budget constraints for an advertiser to which any dimension belongs.
We also study the latter problem (where the entire bid value is always added to the revenue), primarily because of
interesting connections to the classical online admission control problem [5]. In Theorem 4, we give the competitive
ratio of the ADGEN-AON problem (AON for “all or nothing”). As a byproduct of our result, we also obtain tight
bounds for the online admission control problem, slightly improving the classical bounds of [5].
Theorem 4. Let  = maxu,v,s
∑
k∈Ks r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
denote the maximum bid-to-budget ratio and p = maxu∈U,k∈K |{s : k ∈
Ks}| denote the the maximum number of budget constraints for an advertiser that a dimension belongs to. If
1
lg(2p) <  < 1, then the competitive ratio of the ADGEN-AON problem is Θ
(
p

1−

)
.
Note that we do not consider  ≤ 1lg(2p) in Theorem 4, as in this case ADGEN-AON is essentially identical to
ADGENERAL with small bids.
For reasons of brevity, we do not discuss the admission control problem here – the implication of the above
theorem to this problem is straightforward – and relegate the details for the large bids case, both ADGEN-P and
ADGEN-AON, to the appendix.
1P for “partial”
Related Work. Given the large volume of work in this area, we will only sample a small fraction of the online
matching and ADWORDS literature, focusing on results in the (adversarial) online model. For a comprehensive
survey, including results in stochastic input models, the reader is referred to the survey by Mehta [20].
Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani [19] introduced the online matching problem, and gave a tight e/(e−1)-competitive
algorithm (see also [16], [8], and [13]). The first generalization was to the b-matching problem by Kalyanasundaram
and Pruhs [18]. Later generalizations include a vertex-weighted version by Aggarwal et al. [3], a pay-per-click
model using stochastic rewards by Mehta and Panigrahi [21] (see also [23]), and a bi-objective model suggested
by Aggarwal et al. [2]. Devanur and Jain [12] explored non-linear concave objectives to encode, e.g., penalties for
under-delivery. In terms of techniques, most of the initial results used combinatorial methods, but recent work has
focused on a (randomized) primal dual technique introduced by Devanur et al. [13].
The ADWORDS problem, which generalizes b-matching, was introduced by Mehta et al. [22], who gave an
e/(e− 1) approximation for small bids. They also showed that this competitive ratio is the best possible. Without
the small bids assumption, the greedy algorithm for the ADWORDS problem has a competitive ratio of 2, and
while this is tight for deterministic algorithms, obtaining a better ratio using a randomized algorithm is open.
Buchbinder et al. [10] gave an alternative primal-dual analysis for the algorithm of Mehta et al. [22] with the same
competitive ratio. More recently, other variants of the ADWORDS problem have been considered. For instance,
Feldman et al. [14] and Aggarwal et al. [3] introduced variants to model display ads with vertex weights and/or
capacities.
Paper Organization. In Section II, we prove an e/(e − 1) upper bound for ADLAMINAR under the small bids
assumption (Theorem 2). In Section III, we prove an O(lg p) upper bound for ADGENERAL under the small bids
assumptions (Theorem 1). Our results for ADGENERAL without the small bids assumptions (Theorems 3 and 4 for
ADGEN-P and ADGEN-AON, respectively), as well as our Ω(lg p) lower bound for ADGENERAL, can be found
in the appendix.
II. ADWORDS WITH LAMINAR BUDGET CONSTRAINTS (ADLAMINAR)
Recall the ADLAMINAR problem: we given a set of offline bidders U and a set of impressions V that arrive
online, where each bidder-impression pair (u, v) is specified by a bid value r(k)uv for each dimension k ∈ K. The
revenue generated from a bidder u is subject to an arbitrary set of budget constraints Su, where each constraint
s ∈ Su caps the total revenue generated from a subset of dimensions Ks to a given budget B(s)u . We assume that
the sets {Ks : s ∈ Su} form a laminar family, i.e., for every pair of intersecting sets in {Ks : s ∈ Su}, one is
contained in the other.
In this section, we give an algorithm for the ADLAMINAR problem with a competitive ratio of e/(e− 1) under
the small bids assumption (Theorem 2). This bound is tight because of a matching lower bound for the ADWORDS
problem [22]. Throughout this section, we assume that for every dimension k ∈ K, a constraint s with Ks = {k}
appears in Su for each bidder u. This is wlog since a budget can be made arbitrarily large. We will call these
constraints singleton budgets of bidder u.
A. Primal and Dual Formulations
Our algorithm uses a primal-dual formulation of the ADLAMINAR problem. In other words, we give a primal
LP formulation of the ADLAMINAR problem and its corresponding dual, and update the solutions to both LPs on
the arrival of a new impression. The primal updates, which are guided by the dual solution, define the algorithm.
The main challenge is to show that the dual updates maintain feasibility while ensuring that the ratio of the primal
and dual objectives remains bounded by the desired competitive ratio ρ = e/(e− 1).
Let us define the current budget utilization for constraint s of bidder u (denoted κ(s)u ) to be the fraction of budget
B
(s)
u currently used by the algorithm, or formally, κ
(s)
u =
∑
k∈Ks,v r
(k)
uv /B
(s)
u for impressions v assigned to bidder
u thus far. Let us call a dimension k active for bidder u if for all budgets s ∈ Su such that k ∈ Ks, the algorithm
currently has κ(s)u < 1. In other words, u’s active dimensions are the ones on which the algorithm can still receive
revenue from u.
An algorithm for ADLAMINAR might gain revenue from only a subset of dimensions when assigning an
impression to a bidder. To implement this flexibility in the LP, we introduce the notion of assignment types.
Let t ⊆ K. For impression v and bidder u, we define a type-t assignment as one where the dimensions in t are
active and the dimensions in K \ t are inactive. Thus, our decision variables for the LP will be of the form xuvt,
where the algorithm sets xuvt to be 1 if impression v is assigned to bidder u using a type-t assignment (and 0
otherwise). We then define r(k)uvt = r
(k)
uv if k ∈ t; otherwise, r(k)uvt = 0. Our primal LP P is now defined as:
max
∑
u,v,t
xuvt
∑
k
r
(k)
uvt
∀ u ∈ U, s ∈ Su :
∑
v,t
xuvt
∑
k∈Ks
r
(k)
uvt ≤ B(s)u (1)
∀ v ∈ V :
∑
u,t
xuvt ≤ 1 (2)
∀ u ∈ U, v ∈ V, t ⊆ K : xuvt ≥ 0.
Note that Eq. (1) ensures that the algorithm receives no revenue from inactive dimensions for a bidder, and Eq. (2)
ensures that every impression v is assigned using a single type to a single bidder.
The dual D of this LP is defined as:
min
∑
u
∑
s∈Su
α(s)u B
(s)
u +
∑
v
σv
∀ u ∈ U, v ∈ V, t ⊆ K :
∑
s∈Su
(
α(s)u
∑
k∈Ks
r
(k)
uvt
)
+ σv ≥
∑
k
r
(k)
uvt (3)
∀ u ∈ U, s ∈ Su : α(s)u ≥ 0
∀ v ∈ V : σv ≥ 0.
Unfortunately, the dual stated above cannot be used directly in a primal dual algorithm. If a constraint s has budget
utilization κ(s)u = 1, then the dual variable α
(s)
u also needs to be equal to 1 in order to balance the contributions to
the two sides of the dual constraint by dimensions k ∈ Ks. (Note that the primal objective does not increase for
these dimensions and hence the value of σv in the dual objective cannot depend on these dimensions either, if the
ratio of the primal to dual objective is to be maintained.)
Now, if we naı¨vely enforce α(s)u = 1 once a budget B
(s)
u is tight, then the primal-dual ratio could be proportional
to the number of nested levels, if a nested set of budgets are all tight. To obtain a constant competitive ratio,
what our scheme will (roughly speaking) need to do is only set α(s)u to 1 at the highest level of nesting for each
nested set of tight constraint. If we think of the primal objective as being “attributed” to dual variables in order to
maintain the primal dual ratio, then what we roughly want is that at any point of time, the primal objective from
a given dimension for some bidder u is attributed to a unique dual variable representing a budget constraint for u
containing that dimension. However, in order to implement this property in an online setting, α(s)u variables need to
be non-monotone since the budgets in lower nesting levels might become tight first followed by the higher levels.
Therefore, we need a means of raising and lowering each α(s)u so that at the end of the instance, the revenue earned
from a dimension for bidder u is attributed to exactly one of these variables. In general, non-monotonicity of dual
variables is undesirable in online algorithms because a satisfied dual constraint might become unsatisfied later. To
overcome this problem, we give a new dual D′ where we decompose α(s)u into decision variables that are indeed
monotone in our eventual primal-dual analysis.
Formally, our transformed dual D′ is defined as follows. Since each Su is laminar, we can represent its set
system as a forest Fu, where each node in the forest corresponds to a constraint s ∈ Su, and the singleton budgets
are the leaves. Let As be the set of ancestors of s in Fu, including s itself. Define a new decision variable
γ
(s)
u =
∑
s′∈As α
(s′)
u , and let p(s) be the parent budget of s. Observe that α
(s)
u = γ
(s)
u −γ(p(s))u (where for a maximal
set s with no parent in Fu, we set γ
(p(s))
u = 0). Using the new variables, we can rewrite Eqn. (3) in our original
dual formulation as:
∀ u ∈ U, v ∈ V, t ⊆ K :
∑
s∈Su
((
γ(s)u − γ(p(s))u
) ∑
k∈Ks
r
(k)
uvt
)
+ σv ≥
∑
k
r
(k)
uvt. (4)
Next, we observe that the outermost summation on the LHS of Eqn. (4) telescopes, and the only remaining γ(s)u
are those for singleton budgets. This gives us our final dual formulation D′:
min
∑
v
σv +
∑
u
∑
s∈Su
B(s)u
(
γ(s)u − γp(s)u
)
∀ u ∈ U, v ∈ V, t ⊆ K :
∑
k
γ({k})u r
(k)
uvt + σv ≥
∑
k
r
(k)
uvt (5)
∀ u ∈ U, s ∈ Su : γ(s)u − γ(p(s))u ≥ 0. (6)
B. Labeling Scheme
Recalling our above discussion, our goal will be to attribute the revenue earned on a dimension k for bidder
u to exactly one dual variable γ(s)u , ideally to the γ
(s)
u corresponding to the “most-limiting” budget B
(s)
u such
that k ∈ Ks. This suggests that we should make γ(s)u a monotonically increase function of the budget’s current
utilization κ(s)u . However, simply using utilization to define γ
(s)
u does not capture the interactions between budgets
in the laminar setting. The overarching issue with just using κ(s)u is the fact that B
(s)
u might be the most utilized
constraint for only some of the dimensions in Ks, since other budgets that sit below B
(s)
u in the hierarchy may have
higher utilization. This raises the following question: should the revenue currently constrained by these descendant
budgets, say revenue earned on some particular dimension k′, affect how the algorithm determines the extent to
which B(s)u limits other unbounded dimensions like k? The answer is not immediate. It is tempting to say “no” since
the dimension-k′ revenue is already bounded by a tighter budget; on the other hand, B(s)u might in fact become
the tightest budget for dimension k′ later in the instance and ignoring the dimension-k′ revenue till that time will
prevent a smooth transition of the tightest budget for k′.
To overcome this challenge, we introduce a labeling scheme `(s)u : ∪uSu → [0, 1]. Label `(s)u for budget B(s)u will
represent the modified notion of the budget’s utilization that we need to properly measure the remaining capacity
for future revenue. Our primal-dual analysis will then follow by making each dual variable a monotone function
of these labels.
More concretely, we address the above challenge by having our labels maintain the following two high-level
features:
• For label `(s)u and bidder u, revenue from a dimension k ∈ s will only contribute to the label if `(s)u is at
least as large as the labels of all budgets containing k that are subsets of s. This corresponds to identifying
the “most constrained” budget for any dimension by interpreting these abstract labels as surrogates of actual
budget utilizations.
• In defining label `(s)u , we need to identify the capacity of constraint s for future revenue earnings from the
dimensions that are deriving their label from s. We define this capacity as the total budget B(s)u minus the
budgets of constraints below s that have a higher label. This automatically discounts the revenue earning
capacities of dimensions that are deriving labels from descendant constraints of s.
One challenge with maintaining these properties is that they are somewhat circular. To determine the value of
a label, we need to first determine which dimensions count toward the label, but determining dimension inclusion
requires comparisons between label values. Another challenge is maintaining smoothness. As impressions are
assigned to bidders, budgets that were previously slack will become tight, which requires us to reassign dimensions
to labels and change their capacities. In order to make our primal-dual analysis smooth, we will need to ensure
that labels remain consistent after we reassign dimensions to labels and change label capacities.
To overcome the issue of circularity, we will not give an explicit label definition but rather give a set of label
properties that we maintain throughout the algorithm. These properties are based on two sets of budgets, L(s)
and T (s), that the algorithm will dynamically update for all bidders u and budgets B(s)u (we drop the subscript u
for simplicity). The two sets partition the descendant dimensions of s (i.e., each descendant dimension belongs to
exactly one set in L(s)∪T (s)). Intuitively, L(s) contains singleton budgets {k} representing dimensions that count
toward label `(s)u . On the other hand, T (s) contains the closest descendants of s that have a bigger label than s,
i.e., every dimension in s that is not in L(s) derives its label from a budget in T (s) or from one their respective
descendants.
Let R(k)u be the total revenue currently earned on dimension k for bidder u. Formalizing the above discussion,
we say the labels for bidder u are valid if the following three properties hold for all s ∈ Su.
1) Property 1: For all {k} ∈ L(s), all constraints s′ on the path from {k} to s in Fu have `(s
′)
u ≤ `(s)u .
2) Property 2: For all s′ ∈ T (s), we have `(s′)u > `(s)u , and for all s′′ on the path from s′ to s, we have `(s
′′)
u ≤ `(s)u .
3) Property 3: The following identity holds:
`(s)u =
∑
{k}∈L(s)R
(k)
u
B
(s)
u −
∑
s′∈T (s)B
(s′)
u
. (7)
Note that once we have fixed sets T (s) and L(s) for all s, we can verify all three properties and use Eqn. (7) to
directly compute each label for each s ∈ Su. Also observe we can initialize all labels to be 0, and set T (s) = ∅
and L(s) = {{k} : k ∈ K} to start with a valid labeling. Finally, we note that we will soon show that all labels
remain non-negative (in the proof of Lemma 5).
Next, we define a procedure for updating labels after the revenue earned in a single dimension increases
infinitesimally. More specifically, suppose an impression v is assigned to bidder u, and assume we have a valid
labeling for the sets in Su before the assignment. The assignment of the impression changes the values of R
(k)
u for
the active dimensions k. This necessitates label updates, which we define for an infinitesimally small increment in
the value of R(k)u for a particular dimension k. Note that the overall assignment of the impression is a sequence of
such incremental changes.
The labels that we increase on such an increment are `(s)u such that {k} ∈ L(s), i.e., we will increase R(k)u in
the numerator of Eqn. (7) for all such `(s)u and leave T (s) and L(s) fixed. If the labeling is valid before a given
increment, and if after the increment the relative ordering of all `(s)u remains the same, then by the definition of
Properties 1 and 2 the labeling remains valid. Thus, in terms of updating L(s) and T (s), we only need to consider
when the relative order of labels changes as a result of adding to R(k)u . In particular, there are two types of reordering
that need considered. We will call these two reordering possibilities Events 1 and 2 and describe how the algorithm
updates L(s) and T (s) in each case. Later, we will show that these set redefinitions maintain the current value of
the label.
• Event 1: For some s such that {k} ∈ L(s), there now exists a descendant s′ of s such that `(s′)u > `(s)u ,
where s′ is on the path from {k} to s and `(s′)u ≤ `(s)u previously. In this event, s′ is now added to T (s). All
singleton-budgets {k} that are descendants of s′ and belong to L(s) are now removed from L(s). Additionally,
all descendants of s′ that belong to T (s) are also removed from T (s).
• Event 2: For some constraint s such that {k} ∈ L(s), there now exists a descendant s′ of s such that
`
(s)
u ≥ `(s
′)
u , where s′ ∈ T (s) previously. In this event, s′ is removed from T (s). Conversely to Event 1, all
constraints in T (s′) are added to T (s), and all {k} ∈ L(s′) are added to L(s).
In order to make the process smooth, we will think of the updates in Events 1 and 2 as being done at the transition
point where `(s)u = `
(s′)
u . This completes the description of our labeling scheme and the process by which the
algorithm determines them. We encourage the reader to refer to Figure 2 for a small example of an Event 2
update.2 We now prove the following lemma, which will be useful for our primal-dual analysis.
2In terms of how L(s) and T (s) are updated, Event 1 is the reverse of Event 2. So, reversing the example in the Figure 2 will provide
the reader with an Event 1 example.
T ({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {{1, 2}, {4}}
L({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {{3}} {{
B({1,2})u = $15
{
B({1})u = $10
{$5 {
B({2})u = $10
{$5
{
B({4})u = $10
{$9
{
B({3})u = $10
$1
{
B({1,2,3,4})u = $30
B({1,2,3,4})u  B({1,2})u  B({4})u
= 30  15  10 = $5{
$1
$5 + $5
= $10
{$5 {$5
{$9
$10/3{
{
{$40/3
B({1,2,3,4})u  B({4})u = 30  10 = $20
L({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {{1}, {2}, {3}}
T ({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {{4}}
$5 + $5
= $10{
(dim. 1) (dim. 2) (dim. 3)
(dim. 4)
(dimension 3 increases to $10/3)
Fig. 2. Illustration of the modifications made to L(s) and T (s) in Event 2, occurring between budget sets s = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
s′ = {1, 2}. In this example, the algorithm is incrementing the revenue on dimension 3. The state of the labels before dimension
3 revenue is added is shown on top. Notice that {3} ∈ L({1, 2, 3, 4}) since `{3}u = 1/10 is smaller than `{1,2,3,4}u = 1/5 (note
that the value of `{1,2,3,4}u corresponds to the left most rectangle, where the middle and right rectangles show the revenue levels
of the dimensions that are not included in the label). After increasing dimension 3 to $10/3, we have that `{1,2,3,4}u = 2/3, which
means it is about to surpass label `{1,2}u , therefore triggering Event 2. The state of the labels after the Event 2 modifications
are shown on bottom (at the transition point). Notice that {1, 2} has been removed from T ({1, 2, 3, 4}), and we have added
the sets in L({1, 2}) to L({1, 2, 3, 4}) (namely, {1} and {2}).
Lemma 5. For every constraint s, the label `(s)u is monotonically non-decreasing over the course of the algorithm.
Proof: Clearly when neither Event 1 or 2 occurs, `(s)u can only increase (this follows directly from the definition
of the update procedure). Thus, it suffices to show that `(s)u does not decrease when it participates in Event 1 or 2.
In particular, we will show that `(s)u has an identical value after L(s) and T (s) have been modified in either event.
We will show that this holds for Event 1, noting that the argument for Event 2 is identical.
Suppose the updates for Event 1 occur for a constraint s and a descendant s′, triggered by a dimension k ∈ s.
The changes are: s′ is added to T (s), all descendant singleton-budgets of s′ that were in L(s) are removed from
L(s), and all descendants of s′ that were in T (s) are removed from T (s). Recall that before the event, we have
that
`(s)u =
∑
{k}∈L(s)R
(k)
u
B
(s)
u −
∑
w∈T (s)B
(w)
u
`(s
′)
u =
∑
{k}∈L(s′)R
(k)
u
B
(s′)
u −
∑
w′∈T (s′)B
(w′)
u
.
Therefore, using the definitions of L(s) and T (s) before they are modified by the event, the new `(s)u (denoted
`
(s)
new) can be written as:
`
(s)
new =
∑
{k}∈L(s)R
(k)
u −
∑
{k}∈L(s′)R
(k)
u
B
(s)
u −
∑
w∈T (s)B
(w)
u −B(s′)u +
∑
w′∈T (s′)B
(w′)
u
. (8)
Since `(s)u = `
(s′)
u at the moment Event 1 occurs, we have `
(s)
new = `
(s)
u = `
(s′)
u (which follows from the fact that
a/b = c/d = α implies (a− c)/(b− d) = α).
To complete the proof, note that the above argument does not exclude the possibility of
∑
{k}∈L(s)R
(k)
u = 0
and the denominator in Eqn. (8) being negative (if this were to happen, the increments to R(k)u would decrease
the label by making it more negative). However, in both events this cannot be the case. First observe that Event 2
can only occur between two non-zero labels (since in Event 2, s′ ∈ T (s) before the event, which implies a strict
inequality `(s)u < `
(s′)
u ). Event 1 can (and will) occur when `
(s)
u = `
(s′)
u = 0, but in Event 1, the denominator of `
(s′)
u
must always be smaller than the denominator of `(s)u . This is because Event 1 can only occur between two labels
such that {k} ∈ L(s) where k the dimension is currently being incremented. Since `(s′)u is surpassing `(s)u at the
transition point in Event 1, it must be the case that `(s
′)
u is increasing at a higher rate than `
(s)
u . This implies `
(s′)
u
must have a smaller denominator than `(s)u before the modifications to L(s) and T (s).
C. Algorithm Definition and Analysis
Using our dual formulation and labeling scheme, we are now ready to define and analyze our algorithm. Consider
the arrival of impression v. Define gu(s) = maxs′∈As `
(s′)
u , i.e., the maximum label of an ancestor of s in the
forest Fu (including s itself). Our algorithm assigns impression v to bidder u = arg maxu′∈U{Du′v}, where
Duv =
∑
k∈tu(1− eg
({k})
u −1)r(k)uv and tu is the current active dimensions for bidder u.
For the rest of the section, let ρ = e/(e− 1). For a primal assignment of impression v to bidder u, we change
the dual solution by setting σv = ρ ·Duv and update γ(s)u to be
γ(s)u =
eg
(s)
u − 1
e− 1 = ρ(e
g(s)u −1 − e−1),
where g(s)u is computed after the assignment of the current impression v.
For the competitive analysis, it suffices to show that a) the ratio between dual and primal objectives is at most
ρ, and b) the dual solution is feasible.
Primal-Dual Ratio. Our goal is to show that when an impression v is assigned to a bidder u, the change in dual
objective is at most ρ = e/(e−1) times that of the primal objective. First, note that the dual objective is a function
of the labels, and we have argued above that the labels do not change when either of Event 1 or 2 happens.
Therefore, we only need to account for the change in the dual objective when the labels change but neither of the
two events happen. Let us define S∗u as the subset of constraints in Su where the value of γ
(s)
u is different from
γ
(p(s))
u :
S∗u = {s ∈ Su : γ(s)u 6= γ(p(s))u }.
We can rewrite the dual objective as
∑
v∈V σv +
∑
u
∑
s∈S∗u
(
γ
(s)
u − γ(p(s))u
)
B
(s)
u since for all the other terms, the
value of γ(s)u − γ(p(s))u = 0. For any constraint s ∈ S∗u, let p∗u(s) be its closest ancestor in Fu that is also in S∗u.
Now, observe that by Property 2 of labels and the definitionof g(s)u , T (s) = {s′ ∈ S∗u : p∗u(s′) = s} for any s ∈ S∗u.
Then, the dual objective can be further rewritten as
∑
v∈V
σv +
∑
u
∑
s∈S∗u
γ(s)u
B(s)u − ∑
s′∈T (s)
B(s
′)
u
 .
As earlier, we will analyze the change in the dual and primal objectives when the revenue on a dimension k
is incremented by an infinitesimal amount ∆r(k)uv . Note that for any singleton constraint {k}, there is a unique
s ∈ S∗u satisfying k ∈ L(s); furthermore, g({k})u = g(s)u = `(s)u . Therefore, the only dual variable in S∗ (i.e., in the
dual objective given above) that changes is γ(s)u . Let us denote the change in g
(s)
u by ∆g
(s)
u . Using the small bids
assumption, we can write:
∆γ(s)u ·
B(s)u − ∑
s′∈T (s)
B(s
′)
u
 = ∂γ(s)u
∂g
(s)
u
·∆g(s)u ·
B(s)u − ∑
s′∈T (s)
B(s
′)
u

= ρ · (eg(s)u −1) · ∆r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u −
∑
s′∈T (s)B
(s′)
u
·
B(s)u − ∑
s′∈T (s)
B(s
′)
u

= ρ · (eg({k})u −1) ·∆r(k)uv .
Summing over all the infinitesimal changes in revenue, the total change in the dual objective for the assignment
of impression v is given by σv + ρ ·
∑
k∈tu(e
g({k})u −1) · r(k)uv , where tu is the set of active dimensions. Since the
algorithm sets
σv = ρ ·
∑
k∈tu
(1− eg({k})u −1)r(k)uv ,
the total change in the dual objective can be written as:
ρ ·
∑
k∈tu
(1− eg({k})u −1)r(k)uv + ρ ·
∑
k∈tu
(eg
({k})
u −1) · r(k)uv = ρ ·
∑
k∈tu
r(k)uv ,
which is exactly ρ times the increase in the primal objective.
Dual Feasibility. Finally, we argue that the dual is feasible when the algorithm terminates.
Lemma 6. At the end of the algorithm, the dual is feasible.
Proof: The feasibility of Eqn. (5) follows directly from definition of g(s)u , and the fact γ
(s)
u is a non-deceasing
function of g(s)u . We now show Eqn. (6). Let tu be the set of active dimensions for bidder u when impression v
arrived. First, observe that for all k 6∈ tu, we have that g({k})u = 1. This follows from the fact that if k is inactive,
a constraint s ∈ Su containing k has reached κ(s)u = 1 (and thus `(s)u = 1 as well). Since s is an ancestor of {k}
in Fu, we also have g
({k})
u = γ
({k})
u = 1.
Let u′ be the bidder to which the algorithm assigned impression v. Let ĝ(s)u be the value of g
(s)
u when v was
assigned (and define ĝ(s)u′ similarly). We have the following:
∑
k
γ({k})u r
(k)
uvt + σv =
∑
k
γ({k})u r
(k)
uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(1− eĝ({k})u′ −1)r(k)u′v (by substituting σv)
=
∑
k 6∈tu
r
(k)
uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(eg
({k})
u −1 − 1/e)r(k)uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(1− eĝ({k})u′ −1)r(k)u′v, (9)
where the second equality follows by substituting γ({k})u and the fact that γ
({k})
u = 1 for all k 6∈ tu. We can now
establish Eqn. (6) as follows:
∑
k
γ({k})u r
(k)
uvt + σv ≥
∑
k 6∈tu
r
(k)
uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(eg
({k})
u −1 − 1/e)r(k)uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(1− eĝ({k})u −1)r(k)u′v
≥
∑
k 6∈tu
r
(k)
uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(eg
({k})
u −1 − 1/e)r(k)uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(1− eg({k})u −1)r(k)uv
≥
∑
k 6∈tu
r
(k)
uvt + ρ
∑
k∈tu
(1− 1/e)r(k)uvt =
∑
k
r
(k)
uvt (since ρ = e/(e− 1)).
The first inequality follows from Eqn. (9) and the fact that the algorithm assigns v to u′ = arg maxu∈U{Duv}. The
second inequality is because 1 − eg({k})u −1 is a non-increasing function of g({k})u , and the third inequality follows
since r(k)uv ≥ r(k)uvt.
III. ADWORDS WITH GENERAL BUDGET CONSTRAINTS (ADGENERAL)
Recall the ADGENERAL problem: we given a set of offline bidders U and a set of impressions V that arrive
online, where each bidder-impression pair (u, v) is specified by a bid value r(k)uv for each dimension k ∈ K. The
revenue generated from a bidder u is subject to an arbitrary set of budget constraints Su, where each constraint
s ∈ Su caps the total revenue generated from a subset of dimensions Ks to a given budget B(s)u .
In this section, we will prove an O(lg p) upper bound for ADGENERAL (Theorem 1).
A. Algorithm Definition
As in Section II, let κ(s)u denote the current utilization of budget B
(s)
u . The algorithm (we call it ALGO) uses an
exponential potential function defined by:
φ =
∑
u
∑
s
φ(s)u =
∑
u
∑
s
B
(s)
u
p
(
(2p+ 2)κ
(s)
u − 1
)
,
where κ(s)u is defined as the fraction of B
(s)
u that has already been used by the algorithm at any stage. Note that
φ = 0 initially.
At any stage of ALGO, a dimension k is said to be active for bidder u if and only if
∑
s:k∈s
φ(s)u
B
(s)
u
≤ 1; otherwise,
dimension k is said to be inactive for bidder u. (Note that this is a different definition of active dimensions than
what is used in Section II). ALGO only attempts to earn revenue on active dimensions, and hence, the total revenue
if impression v is allocated to bidder u is given by:
ruv =
∑
k∈Au
r(k)uv , where Au is the set of current active dimensions for bidder u.
The algorithm makes a greedy assignment with respect to ruv, i.e., it assigns impression v to arg maxu ruv. Note
that it is possible that Au = ∅ for all bidders u, and therefore the algorithm does not assign impression v to any
bidder, even though there are dimensions and bidders where it could have earned revenue. This completes the
description of our algorithm.
B. Algorithm Analysis
For our analysis, it will be sufficient to quantify the small bids assumption as the following property for any
impression v, bidder u, dimension k, and constraint s such that k ∈ s:∑
k∈s
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
≤ 1
lg(2p+ 2)
. (10)
We first establish the feasibility of the solution, which follows almost directly from how we define active dimensions.
Lemma 7. If ALGO assigns an impression v to a bidder u, then it can earn revenue on all the active dimensions
Au of u without violating any constraint.
Proof: We need to show that for all constraints s of bidder u,
κ(s)u +
∑
k∈Au∩s
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
≤ 1.
Suppose not. Then, for some constraint s,
κ(s)u +
∑
k∈Au∩s
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
> 1
i.e., κ(s)u +
1
lg(2p+ 2)
> 1 (by the small bids assumption Eqn. (10))
i.e., (2p+ 2)κ
(s)
u +
1
lg(2p+2) > 2p+ 2
i.e., (2p+ 2)κ
(s)
u > p+ 1
i.e.,
pφ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
+ 1 > p+ 1
i.e.,
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
> 1,
which contradicts the fact that dimension k is active for bidder u.
This lemma implies that ALGO is indeed able to earn revenue on all active dimensions of a bidder u when it
assigns an impression to u.
Next, we will bound the total revenue of an optimal solution that we denote by OPT against the total revenue
of ALGO. Let uOPT(v) (resp., uALGO(v)) be the bidder that OPT (resp., ALGO) allocates impression v to. For every
dimension k that OPT earns revenue from, one of the following holds:
1) Case 1: dimension k is active for bidder uOPT(v) in ALGO when impression v arrives, and ALGO assigns v
to the same bidder, i.e., uALGO(v) = uOPT(v).
2) Case 2: dimension k is active for bidder uOPT(v) in ALGO when impression v arrives, but ALGO assigns v
to a different bidder, i.e., uALGO(v) 6= uOPT(v).
3) Case 3: dimension k is inactive for bidder uOPT(v) in ALGO when impression v arrives.
We partition the dimensions that OPT earns revenue from into active and inactive dimensions (according to their
status in ALGO for bidder uOPT(v)). For active dimensions, the next lemma gives a straightforward charging argument
using the greediness of the choice made by ALGO.
Lemma 8. For any impression v, the total revenue earned by OPT on the active dimensions is at most the total
revenue earned by ALGO overall.
Proof: For case 1 above (OPT and ALGO choose the same bidder), the two algorithms earn the same revenue
on the active dimensions. For case 2 above, the fact ALGO makes a greedy choice implies that it earns at least as
much revenue by assigning to different bidder as it would have made by assigning to u, which includes the revenue
on all the active dimensions.
The more involved case is that of inactive dimensions. In this case, we use a different global charging argument
over all dimensions, based on the potential function. In particular, we show that for a bidder u, the total revenue
of OPT from inactive dimensions (recall that this only includes revenue from impressions that arrived after the
dimension became inactive in ALGO) can be charged, up to a logarithmic loss, to the revenue that ALGO earned
overall from bidder u.
Lemma 9. Fix a bidder u. The total revenue that OPT earns in inactive dimensions for bidder u is at most the
final potential of bidder u in ALGO.
Proof: For any dimension k, let v ∈ Vu,k denote the subset of impressions assigned to u by OPT that arrived
after k became an inactive dimension for bidder u in ALGO. We need to bound the total revenue earned by OPT
on dimension k from impressions in Vu,k, summed over all k. For any impression v ∈ Vu,k, we have:∑
s:k∈s
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
> 1,
where φ(s)u is the final potential for constraint s of bidder u. Thus,the revenue that OPT earns from impressions
v ∈ Vu,k on dimension k, summed over all dimensions, can be bounded as follows:∑
k
∑
v∈Vu,k
r(k)uv <
∑
k
∑
v∈Vu,k
r(k)uv
∑
s:k∈s
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
=
∑
s
φ(s)u
∑
k∈s
∑
v∈Vu,k
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
≤
∑
s
φ(s)u ,
where the last inequality follows from the feasibility of OPT.
Finally, we need to lower bound the final potential of a bidder in terms in terms of the revenue it generates for
ALGO. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 10. The increase in potential of a bidder u during the course of ALGO is at most 4 lg(2p+ 2) times the
revenue that ALGO earns from u.
Proof: Suppose ALGO assigns impression v to bidder u. Let Ka denote the set of active dimensions for bidder
u when this assignment is made. Let η(s)u =
∑
k:k∈Ka∩s
r(k)uv
B
(s)
u
. Then, the increase in potential is given by:
∑
s
∆φ(s)u =
∑
s
B
(s)
u
p
(
(2p+ 2)κ
(s)
u +η
(s)
u − (2p+ 2)κ(s)u
)
=
∑
s
B
(s)
u
p
(2p+ 2)κ
(s)
u
(
(2p+ 2)η
(s)
u − 1
)
=
∑
s
(
φ(s)u +
B
(s)
u
p
)
·
(
2η
(s)
u ·lg(2p+2) − 1
)
≤
∑
s
(
φ(s)u +
B
(s)
u
p
)
· 2 lg(2p+ 2) ·
∑
k:k∈Ka∩s
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
, (11)
where the last inequality follows since η(s)u =
∑
k:k∈Ka∩s
r(k)uv
B
(s)
u
and ax ≤ 1 + ax for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, a ≥ 1. By
rearranging the RHS of inequality (11), we have:∑
s
∆φ(s)u ≤ 2 lg(2p+ 2) ·
∑
k∈Ka
r(k)uv ·
(∑
s:k∈s
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
+
|{s : k ∈ s}|
p
)
≤ 4 lg(2p+ 2) ·
∑
k∈Ka
r(k)uv ,
since k is active and p ≥ |{s : k ∈ s}|.
A competitive ratio of O(lg p) for ADGENERAL in the small bids case now follows from Lemmas 7, 9, and 10,
completing proof of the upper bound in Theorem 1.
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APPENDIX A
ADGEN-AON LOWER BOUND
In this section, we prove the lower bound for Theorem 4. As a byproduct of this lower bound, we also obtain
tight bounds for the online admission control problem, slightly improving the classical bounds of [Awerbuch et al.
1993].
Recall that we assume  > 1lg(2p) . In our instance, we have a single advertiser with a set of p budget constraints
(we index budget constraints by s), where each constraint has a budget of 1. We will assume that p

1− is integral.
(Note that  > 1lg(2p) implies that p

1− > 2.) Each impression has bid value of  on a single, unique dimension.
(This allows us to use impressions and dimensions interchangeably in the rest of the construction.) We are now
left to specify the mapping of impressions to constraints. Let us denote ` = 1− . First, we construct a hierarchical
segmentation of the constraints 1, 2, . . . , p, where segment j of level i comprises constraints (j−1) ·p1−i/`+1, (j−
1) · p1−i/` + 2, . . . , j · p1−i/`. Overall, there are ` + 1 levels i = 0, 1, . . . , `, and level i partitions the overall set
of p constraints into pi/` segments j = 1, 2, . . . , pi/`. Each such segment comprises p1−i/` constraints. Note that
the segments in level i are a refinement of the segments in level i− 1. For the purpose of visualization, the reader
can imagine a complete p1/`-ary tree on p leaves, where each leaf represents a constraint and each internal node
corresponds to a segment.
The online arrival of impressions is divided into `+ 2 rounds. The first round is special and is called the initial
round (described below). Every subsequent round, indexed 0, 1, . . . , `, comprises a set of impression blocks. Each
impression block of round i corresponds to a unique segment in level i. Such an impression block comprises 1/
identical impressions, all of which appear in all constraints of the segment of level i that the impression block
corresponds to. Clearly, the total number of impression blocks in round i is at most the total number of segments
in level i, i.e., at most pi/`. However, not all segments receive an impression block corresponding to it; only the
active segments (we define this notion below) in level i receive an impression block. Therefore, the arrival rule for
round i is simple: every active segment in level i receives a unique impression block. The relative order of arrival
of impressions in a round is arbitrary. As we mentioned above, the initial round is special — in this round, there
is a single impression with bid value δ > 0 that appears in all constraints.
Now, we are only left to describe the rule for defining active segments. After the initial round, all segments
in all levels are inactive, except the single segment in level 0 comprising all dimension. Therefore, in round 0,
there is a single impression block corresponding to all the constraints. Next, we define the inductive process for
activating segments. Recall that the impression blocks arriving in round i ≥ 0 correspond to the active segments in
level i. The algorithm assigns some subset of these impressions to the sole advertiser. For any segment j in level i
that received an impression block, if the algorithm assigned t > 0 impressions from the block, then all impression
blocks at level i+ t that are refinements of the current block are made active. After round i, all segments in level
i are made inactive. This completes the description of the instance.
First, we need to show that the construction is valid. In particular, we need to show that i+ t ≤ ` (i.e., there is
a level where the refined segments can be activated) if the algorithm assigns t impressions of a segment in round
i. We prove a more general lemma.
Lemma 11. At any point of time, if a segment in level i is active, then every constraint in that segment has a
current utilization of i+ δ.
Proof: The algorithm must assign the impression in the initial round to stay competitive; therefore, the lemma
holds for i = 0. Inductively, the segments that are made active at level i+ t had utilization i before round i (by
the inductive hypothesis) and have an additional utilization of t from round i.
As a corollary of this lemma, we can infer that i+t ≤ ` since utilization cannot exceed 1; hence, the construction
is valid.
Let `s be the last round where constraint s was in an active segment, and let the corresponding segment be τs.
For every constraint s, the optimal solution assigns the entire impression block corresponding to τs in level `s.
Note that the segments τs partition the set of constraints, and hence, the optimal assignment is feasible. Clearly,
the optimal solution earns a revenue of 1 on the impression block corresponding to segment τs.
To compare the revenue of the algorithm, we redistribute the revenue earned by the algorithm on an impression
by dividing it equally among all the constraints that the impression appears in. Next, we sum the revenues on
constraints in the same segment τs. We will now compare this revenue on τs with the unit revenue that the optimal
solution earns. To upper bound the (redistributed) revenue of the algorithm, we first note that the algorithm does
not earn any revenue on the impression block τs itself in round `s. If `s ≤ ` − 1, this follows from the fact that
refinements of τs were not marked active. If `s = `, then by Lemma 11, the utilization at the beginning of the
round is 1 −  + δ, which prevents the algorithm from earning any further revenue (note that revenue comes in
units of ).
Lemma 12. The total revenue earned by segment τs in the algorithm is at most 2p1/` .
Proof: Let r0, r1, . . . , rj denote the rounds in which segment τs earns revenue, and let t0, t1, . . . , tj be the
number of impressions assigned in the respective rounds. In other words, r0 = 0, r1 = t0+r0, r2 = t1+r1, . . . , `s =
rj + tj . Then, the revenue earned by constraint s is
j∑
q=0
tq · 1
p1−rq/`
≤  ·
`s−1∑
i=0
1
p1−i/`
≤ 2
p1−(`s−1)/`
,
where the last inequality follows since p−1/` ≤ 1/2 for ` ≤ lg p which follows from  > 1lg(2p) . Since τs comprises
p1−`s/` constraints, the revenue earned by the algorithm on segment τs is at most 2p1/` .
The lower bound now follows by comparing Lemma 12 to the optimal revenue, and setting δ → 0.
APPENDIX B
ADGENERAL AND ADGEN-P LOWER BOUND (THEOREM 1 AND THEOREM 3)
In this section, we prove a Ω(lg p) lower bound for ADGENERAL that will be constructed via a reduction from
the online problem considered by Awerbuch et al. in [5], which we call ADMISSION-CONTROL. At the end of
the section, we will describe how the problem definition of ADMISSION-CONTROL can be modified so that the
reduction implies the same lower bound for ADGEN-P. We formally define this problem as follows.
ADMISISON-CONTROL: At the outset, the online algorithm is given an edge-capacitated graph G = (V,E), where
ce denotes the capacity of edge e. Demand requests then arrive in an online sequence R = 〈r1, . . . , rh〉, where each
request ri is specified by a path Pi between two vertices (si, ti) and a capacity demand di. Upon the arrival of
ri, the algorithm must decide to either reject the request or route it along Pi. The objective of the algorithm is to
maximize the total demand of admitted requests subject to the constraint that for any edge e, the sum of capacity
demands from admitted requests using e does not exceed ce.
We note that this is a less general problem than the one considered in [5] (e.g. in the original problem, the
algorithm can choose routing paths, requests have arrival times, etc.); however to extend their lower bound, the
above problem definition will suffice.
For completeness, we will give the proof of the “small-demands” ADMISSION-CONTROL lower bound from [5]
(i.e. in the given instance, the maximum demand-to-capacity ratio is arbitrarily small). This will be useful as our
reduction will not be completely “black-box”, i.e., we need to have some knowledge of the proof’s online sequence
in order to perform the reduction.
Let L(n) be the line graph defined on n+ 1 vertices {v1, . . . , vn+1} (with n edges). Then the following lemma
holds.
Lemma 13. ( [5]) Let A an online algorithm for ADMISSION-CONTROL under the small demands assumption.
Then there exists an instance I for L(n) such that the capacity earned by the optimal solution is Ω(lg n) times the
demand earned by A.
Proof:
Without loss of generality, assume n is a power of two. The instance will consist of lg n+ 1 phases indexed by
i = 0, . . . , lg n. In phase i, we will issue 2i groups of requests. The jth group in phase i consists of 1/δ requests
each with capacity demand δ and identical routing paths Pj (and so the total capacity for each group in every phase
is 1).
Fix a phase i and group j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2i − 1}. Then path Pj is defined to be the segment of L(n) starting at
vertex v jn
2i
and ending at vertex v (j+1)n
2i
. In other words, in a given phase we are splitting L(n) into 2i edge -disjoint
subsegments each of the length n/2i, where each subsegment defines a path for a group.
Let xi be the total demand admitted by the algorithm from requests in phase i. Observe that in order to admit a
unit of demand from the requests in phase i, the algorithm must use up a total capacity of n/2i (since each path
Pj in phase i has n/2i edges). Since the total capacity of edges in the graph is n, we have that
∑lgn
i=0 2
−inxi ≤ n.
This implies that
lgn∑
i=0
2−ixi ≤ 1. (12)
Let Sk = 2−k
∑k
i=0 xi be the normalized total capacity obtained by the algorithm from phases 0 through k. By
equation (12), we have that
lgn∑
k=0
Sk =
lgn∑
k=0
k∑
i=0
2−kxi ≤ 2
lgn∑
k=0
2−kxk ≤ 2.
Thus, there exists a k′ such that Sk′ ≤ 2/ lg n, implying the algorithm only earned at most 2k′+1/ lg n total capacity
after the completion of phase k′. The optimal solution at this point is to reject all requests before phase k′ and
admit all requests in phase k′ to obtain capacity 2k′ . Therefore, the adversary can stop the sequence after phase k′
to obtain the desired instance.
Given Lemma 13 and its proof, let I be the instance implied by the statement of the lemma, and let I ′ be the
entire of sequence of requests given by the construction (all lg n+1 phases, regardless of the algorithm’s behavior).
We construct our lower bound instance for ADGEN-AON (in the same bids case) as follows.
• There will be one bidder u for the instance.
• Each group in I ′ will correspond to both a dimension and an impression. Specifically, for all impressions that
correspond to the vth group in I ′, we set r(v)uv = δ and r
(k)
uv = 0 for all k 6= v.
• Each edge e will correspond to a budget constraint B(se)u , where the capacity of the budget is ce = 1 and set
se is defined to be the set of dimensions whose corresponding request group use edge e along their paths in
I ′.
Observe that the single request in phase 1 of I ′ traverses all of L(n); therefore based on the construction, the
first dimension belongs to n different budget constraints, which implies p = n. It now follows from Lemma 13
that any algorithm for ADGEN-AON is Ω(lg p) competitive.
Extension to ADGEN-P: To show a Ω(lg p) lower bound for ADGENERAL (without the small bids assumption),
we modify the definition of ADMISSION-CONTROL so that algorithm chooses to accept each request with some
fraction fi ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., the algorithm routes demand fi ·di for request ri). We then change the lower bound instance
in Lemma 13 so that each request has unit demand (instead of issuing 1/δ requests with δ demand). The remainder
of the reduction is equivalent. Using the same arguments as before, we obtain the desired Ω(lg p) lower bound for
the ADGEN-P setting.
APPENDIX C
ADGEN-P AND ADGEN-AON UPPER BOUND (THEOREM 3 AND THEOREM 4)
In this section, we give our upper bounds for ADGEN-P and ADGEN-AON. We will first present the algorithm
under the context ADGEN-AON. At the end of the section, we will outline how the same analysis extends to
ADGEN-P. In both settings, the algorithm and analysis will be almost identical to our algorithm for ADGENERAL
in Section III.
A. Algorithm Definition
Again let κ(s)u denote the fraction of B
(s)
u currently used by the algorithm. The algorithm (we call it ALGO) uses
an exponential potential function defined by:
φ =
∑
u
∑
s
φ(s)u =
∑
u
∑
s
B
(s)
u
p
(
(p+ 1)
κ
(s)
u
1− − 1
)
.
Note that φ = 0 initially.
At any stage of ALGO, a dimension k is said to be active for bidder u if and only if
∑
s:k∈s
φ(s)u
B
(s)
u
≤ 1, else
dimension k is said to be inactive for bidder u. (Note that this is a different definition of active dimensions than
what is used in Section II). ALGO only attempts to earn revenue on active dimensions, and hence, the total revenue
if impression v is allocated to bidder u is given by:
ruv =
∑
k∈Au
r(k)uv , where Au is the set of current active dimensions for bidder u.
The algorithm makes a greedy assignment with respect to ruv, i.e., it assigns impression v to arg maxu ruv. Note
that it is possible that Au = ∅ for all bidders u, and therefore the algorithm does not assign impression v to any
bidder, even though there are dimensions and bidders where it could have earned revenue. This completes the
description of our algorithm.
B. Algorithm Analysis
We first establish feasibility of the solution.
Lemma 14. If ALGO assigns an impression v to a bidder u, then it can earn revenue on all the active dimensions
Au of u without violating any constraint.
Proof: We need to show that for all constraints s of bidder u, κ(s)u +
∑
k∈Au∩s
r(k)uv
B
(s)
u
≤ 1. Suppose not. Then,
for some constraint s,
κ(s)u +  ≥ κ(s)u +
∑
k∈Au∩s
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
> 1 (by the definition of )
i.e., (p+ 1)
κ
(s)
u +
1− > (p+ 1)
1
1−
i.e., (p+ 1)
κ
(s)
u
1− > p+ 1
(
since
κ
(s)
u
1−  > 1 from the first line
)
i.e.,
pφ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
+ 1 > p+ 1
i.e.,
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
> 1,
which contradicts the fact that dimension k is active for bidder u.
This lemma implies that ALGO is indeed able to earn revenue on all active dimensions of a bidder u when it
assigns an impression to u.
Next, we will bound the total revenue of an optimal solution that we denote by OPT against the total revenue
of ALGO. Let uOPT(v) (resp., uALGO(v)) be the bidder that OPT (resp., ALGO) allocates impression v to. For every
dimension k that OPT earns revenue from, one of the following holds:
1) Case 1: dimension k is active for bidder uOPT(v) in ALGO when impression v arrives, and ALGO assigns v
to the same bidder, i.e., uALGO(v) = uOPT(v).
2) Case 2: dimension k is active for bidder uOPT(v) in ALGO when impression v arrives, but ALGO assigns v
to a different bidder, i.e., uALGO(v) 6= uOPT(v).
3) Case 3: dimension k is inactive for bidder uOPT(v) in ALGO when impression v arrives.
We partition the dimensions that OPT earns revenue from into active and inactive dimensions (according to
their status in ALGO for bidder uOPT(v)). For active dimensions (cases 1 and 2 above), the next lemma gives
a straightforward charging argument using the greediness of the choice made by ALGO.
Lemma 15. For any impression v, the total revenue earned by OPT on the active dimensions is at most the total
revenue earned by ALGO overall.
Proof: For case 1 above (OPT and ALGO choose the same bidder), the two algorithms earn the same revenue
on the active dimensions. For case 2 above, the fact that ALGO makes a greedy choice implies that it earns at least
as much revenue by assigning to a different bidder as it would have made by assigning to u, which includes the
revenue on all the active dimensions.
The more involved case is that of inactive dimensions (case 3 above). In this case, we use a different global
charging argument over all dimensions, based on the potential function. In particular, we show that for a bidder
u, the total revenue of OPT from inactive dimensions (recall that this only includes revenue from impressions that
arrived after the dimension became inactive in ALGO) can be charged, up to a loss equal to the desired competitive
ratio, to the revenue that ALGO earned overall from bidder u.
Lemma 16. Fix a bidder u. The total revenue that OPT earns in inactive dimensions for bidder u is at most the
final potential of bidder u in ALGO.
Proof: For any dimension k, let Vu,k denote the subset of impressions assigned to u by OPT that arrived after
k became an inactive dimension for bidder u in ALGO. We need to bound the total revenue earned by OPT on
dimension k from impressions in Vu,k, summed over all k. For any impression v ∈ Vu,k, we have:∑
s:k∈s
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
> 1,
where φ(s)u is the final potential for constraint s of bidder u. Thus, the revenue that OPT earns from impressions
v ∈ Vu,k on dimension k, summed over all dimensions, can be bounded as follows:∑
k
∑
v∈Vu,k
r(k)uv <
∑
k
∑
v∈Vu,k
r(k)uv
∑
s:k∈s
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
=
∑
s
φ(s)u
∑
k∈s
∑
v∈Vu,k
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
≤
∑
s
φ(s)u ,
where the last inequality follows by the feasibility of OPT.
Next, we need to lower bound the final potential of a bidder in terms of the revenue that ALGO earns from her.
This is given in the next lemma.
Lemma 17. The increase in potential of a bidder u during the course of ALGO is at most 4 · p

1−
 times the revenue
that ALGO earns from u.
Proof: Suppose ALGO assigns impression v to bidder u. Let Ka denote the set of active dimensions for bidder
u when this assignment is made. Let η(s)u =
∑
k:k∈Ka∩s
r(k)uv
B
(s)
u
. The increase in potential for bidder u is given as
follows:
∑
s
∆φ(s)u =
∑
s
B
(s)
u
p
(
(p+ 1)
κ
(s)
u +η
(s)
u
1− − (p+ 1)κ
(s)
u
1−
)
=
∑
s
B
(s)
u
p
(p+ 1)
κ
(s)
u
1−
(
(p+ 1)
η
(s)
u
1− − 1
)
=
∑
s
(
φ(s)u +
B
(s)
u
p
)
·
((
(p+ 1)

1−
) η(s)u
 − 1
)
≤
∑
s
(
φ(s)u +
B
(s)
u
p
)
· (p+ 1)

1−

·
∑
k:k∈Ka∩s
r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
, (13)
where the inequality follows since η(s)u =
∑
k:k∈Ka∩s
r(k)uv
B
(s)
u
≤  and ax ≤ 1 + ax for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, a ≥ 1. By
rearranging the RHS of inequality (13) and using the fact that |{s : k ∈ s}| ≤ p, we obtain:
∑
s
∆φ(s)u ≤
(p+ 1)

1−

∑
k∈Ka
r(k)uv ·
(∑
s:k∈s
φ
(s)
u
B
(s)
u
+
|{s : k ∈ s}|
p
)
≤ 2 · (p+ 1)

1−

∑
k∈Ka
r(k)uv (since k is active, and p ≥ |{s : k ∈ s}|)
≤ 4 · p

1−

∑
k∈Ka
r(k)uv
(
since (p+ 1)

1− ≤ 2 · p 1− for large enough p
)
,
as desired.
A competitive ratio of O
(
p

1−

)
for ADGEN-AON now follows from Lemmas 15, 16, and 17.
C. Extension to ADGEN-P
We begin by noting that for ADGEN-P, we will assume that the maximum bid-to-budget ratio maxu,v,s
∑
k∈Ks r
(k)
uv
B
(s)
u
<
1. Obviously, this assumption is wlog for ADGEN-AON since any u, v pair that results in  > 1 cannot be assigned
(and it is easy to show an arbitrarily large lower bound when  = 1). For ADGEN-P, however, allowing instances
where  > 1 still admits a nontrivial problem definition since the algorithm can choose to earn partial revenues.
However, since such a scenario would clearly never arise in practice (i.e, an impression generating more revenue
than a budget) and only complicates the analysis, we proceed with this added assumption.
To adapt our ADGEN-AON algorithm and analysis for ADGEN-P, the algorithm will now choose to earn 1lg(2p+2)
fraction of all revenues and set the parameter  = 1lg(2p+2) in algorithm and proof (so essentially the algorithm
treats the instance as if its a ADGENERAL small-bids instance). Otherwise, the algorithm behaves identically as
before. Since we are assuming the maximum bid-to-budget ratio is at most 1, this scaling procedure ensures that the
revenue generated by an impression never increases the utilization of a constraint by more than a 1lg(2p+2) factor.
To show a O(lg p) competitive ratio, it suffices to show that Lemmas 14 through 17 still hold in this setting. It
is not too hard to verify that Lemmas 14, 16, and 17 follow by the same arguments, noting that in these proofs,
r
(k)
uv still denotes the revenue earned by the algorithm after its been reduced by a 1lg(2p+2) factor (except in Lemma
16, r(k)uv denotes the amount of revenue the optimal solution chooses to earn). Lemma 15 uses the same argument,
except now the greedy property implies that the algorithm earns at least a 1lg(2p+2) factor of that earned by the
optimal solution on a active dimension (instead of strictly more); however, losing this factor in this case is fine
since the we are ultimately aiming for a O(lg p) competitive ratio. Hence, our algorithm extends to the ADGEN-P
setting.
